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Rescuing the Concept of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance 
  
 
 
Chanchal Kumar Sharma 
Abstract: 
This article restores the concept of vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) to its original meaning. The literature shows that 
there is neither a universally accepted definition of VFI nor a commonly accepted approach to measuring it. Estimates 
of VFI are derived, much like accounting or deficit measurements, by comparing the revenues and expenditures of two 
levels of government. VFI is, however, too nuanced an issue to be described by this kind of national accounting 
procedure.  We argue that ease of measurement should always take second place to the appropriateness of the economic 
concepts used; it makes no sense to adopt a definition that is convenient for measurement if it does not have a sound 
theoretical basis. The conventional definition of VFI however, falls into this trap, and the ad hoc definition was 
adopted for its expedience. This measure does not reflect whether taxes and expenditures across the various levels of 
government are too high, too low or about right. Unfortunately, the sacrifice of rigour for tractability has seriously 
harmed the quality of public policy debate on the issue.    
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following published article, which can be used for the purposes of citation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
CVNWTZF3 
This article examines the concept of vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI), which remains under debate 
because there is neither a universally accepted definition of VFI in the fiscal federalism literature 
(Table 1) nor a commonly accepted approach to measuring it (Table 2). Estimates of VFI are 
derived, much like accounting or deficit measurements, by comparing the revenues and 
expenditures of two levels of government. VFI is, however, too nuanced an issue to be described 
by this kind of national accounting procedure.   
 
The problem we address is substantive, but also has an important terminological dimension. 
Terms such as VFI and VFG (vertical fiscal gap) are often used to structure political debate in 
federations, but different authors use them with different meanings and thus cause ambiguity in 
the policy solutions to the assumed problems. The imprecise usage of VFI (Table 1) and VFG 
(Table 3) for different ideas in different contexts makes it difficult to combine the results of 
papers, which might employ the same concept for different ideas or different concepts for the 
same idea. Thus, this paper attempts to resolve the terminological ambiguity that obscures these 
substantive issues in policy.  
 
 TABLE 1 Vertical Fiscal Imbalance: Various Definitions 
Author Definition of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance 
Bird (2003, p. 8) “Vertical fiscal balance is achieved—when expenditure and revenues (including transfers) 
are balanced for the richest local government, measured in terms of its capacity to raise 
resources on its own.” 
Bird and Tarasov 
(2004, p. 80) 
“The concept of vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) —the “fiscal gap” as it has been called 
(Boadway and Hobson, 1993)—is often discussed as though in an ideal government structure 
the “own-source” revenues of each level of government should be sufficient to finance the 
expenditure for which it is responsible without recourse to intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers.” 
Boadway, and 
Tremblay (2006, p.3) 
“Vertical fiscal imbalance is a situation in which the size of transfers made by the federal 
government to the provinces falls well short of the amount of federal tax revenues relative to 
their expenditure responsibilities, that is, what one might think of as the optimal vertical 
fiscal gap.” 
Breton (1998, p. 197) VFI is “the mismatch of own revenues and expenditures of governments located at various 
jurisdictional tiers — and the consequent flow of funds among governments.” 
Collins (2002, p. 26) “The term vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) relates to a mismatch for an individual level of 
government (federal, state or local) between its revenue-raising powers and expenditure 
responsibilities. To be more specific, VFI implies a mismatch between a particular level of 
government’s own-source revenues (not including grants from other levels of government) 
and own-purpose expenditures (not including grants to other levels of government).”  
Hallwood and 
MacDonald (2005, p. 
96)  
“The phenomenon of central government having greater power to obtain income than it 
actually needs for the exercise of its authority, while the sub-central level has less power to 
raise income than it needs is referred to in the fiscal federalism literature as vertical 
imbalance.”  
Hunter (1977,  cited 
in Mathews 1980, 
p.10) 
Vertical balance can be said to exist to the extent to which the basic allocation of revenues 
and expenditures was such that “governments at each level can command the financial 
resources necessary for them to carry out their expenditure responsibilities and to be held 
accountable for both spending and taxing decisions.” 
Matier,Wu and 
Jackson (2001, p. 2) 
 
VFI exists “if one level of government has fiscal room available to reduce taxes or increase 
program spending -- and satisfy its intertemporal constraint -- while the other level of 
government must increase taxes or reduce spending in order to satisfy its intertemporal 
budget constraint.”  
McLure (1994, p. 
154) 
VFI arises when (1) the center collects taxes more easily and at lower economic cost than 
subnational governments; (2) the central government preempts revenue sources that 
subnational governments might use. 
Rodden, and Wibbels 
(2002, p. 505) 
VFI is “the degree to which subnational spending is financed by revenue transfers from the 
center (as opposed to locally raised taxes, fees, and so on).” 
Ruggeri and Howard 
(2001, p. 5) 
Vertical fiscal imbalances are the potential result of the dynamics of fiscal structures within a 
federation. They arise when there is a relative mismatch between the revenue growth and 
spending pressures of different orders of government.  
Shah (2006, p. 28) Vertical fiscal imbalance = Need for transfers 
Shah (2007, p. 17) “A vertical fiscal imbalance occurs when the vertical fiscal gap is not adequately addressed 
by the reassignment of responsibilities or by fiscal transfers and other means.” 
Wagner (1973, p. 42 ) VFI exists when the national government has an excess supply of revenue while state and 
local governments have an excess supply of needs. 
Walter (2004, p. 3) 
 
VFI is  “the inability of one level of government…to fund its own responsibilities from its 
own revenue streams without monies from elsewhere, in this case by 
borrowing” 
Webb (2002, p. 1) “The difference between the relative revenue and spending responsibilities of the 
Commonwealth and States is known as vertical fiscal imbalance.”  
TABLE  2 Various Formulae for Measuring VFI 
Author Measure of VFI 
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CVI 1= 1—Revenue sharing + Untied and Other Transfers Total SNGs’ Expenditures. 
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V: Coefficient of Vertical Balance  ;  V = 1 indicates perfect balance 
Osterkamp and Eller 
(2003) Intergovernmental Transfers SNGs’ Expenditures 
 
 
Rao and Singh 
(2002) 
1. Per cent of States' Own Current revenue to Total Current Revenue 
2. Per cent of States’ Current Expenditure to Total Current      Expenditure 
3. Per cent of States' Own Current Revenue to States' Current Expenditure 
4. Per cent of States' Expenditure* to Total Expenditure* 
* Current + Capital 
Rodden and Wibbels 
(2002) Grants +Revenue sharing  Total SNG Revenues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. The Problem of Conceptual Ambiguity 
Why should we be concerned that VFI, a key concept in fiscal federalism literature, is often 
defined in different ways? The different usages of VFI have major implications for the ways that 
federations are organised, for the levels of public services that are provided and for the taxes that 
are imposed to finance these services. Nevertheless, there have been few attempts to clarify the 
definition of VFI. Instead, the imprecise definition of VFI as ‘a mismatch between revenues and 
expenditures at different levels of government’ has been adopted as the standard because it 
measures VFI within the familiar dimensions of fiscal structures.  
 
We argue that ease of measurement should always take second place to the appropriateness of 
the economic concepts used; it makes no sense to adopt a definition that is convenient for 
measurement if it does not have a sound theoretical basis. The conventional definition of VFI 
however, falls into this trap, and the ad hoc definition was adopted for its expedience. This 
TABLE  3 Vertical Fiscal Gap: Various Definitions 
Author Definition of Vertical Fiscal Gap 
Boadway (2004, p.7) “The VFG refers to the desired asymmetry in revenue-raising between the federal 
and provincial governments.” 
Courchene (2006, p. 47)   “A ‘vertical fiscal gap’ exists when the federal or central government collects more 
in revenues than it needs for its own constitutional purposes.” 
Joumard and Kongsrud 
(2003, p. 167) 
 “A ‘fiscal gap’ is defined as the difference between subnational government 
spending responsibilities and their revenue-raising powers.” 
Lewis (2002, p. 154)  “The fiscal gap is defined as the difference between expenditure needs (EN) and 
fiscal capacity (FC). That is: FGi =EN i — FC i”  
Shah (2006, p.7) “Fiscal Gap is a structural imbalance (produced) as a result of a mismatch between 
revenue means and expenditure needs.” 
Shah (2007, p.17) “A vertical fiscal gap is defined as the revenue deficiency arising from a mismatch 
between revenue means and expenditure needs, typically of lower orders of 
government.” 
Smart (2005, p.2) “(There is a) commonly held notion that in a federation revenue-raising authority 
should be more centralized than expenditure authority. The result is typically a 
vertical fiscal gap (VFG) between revenue and expenditure on own account at the 
central and local levels, which must be closed through transfers.” 
Wilson (1996, p. 9)  “The fiscal gap refers to the gap between the expenditure needs and the revenues 
available to various levels of government.” 
measure does not reflect whether taxes and expenditures across the various levels of government 
are too high, too low or about right. Unfortunately, the sacrifice of rigour for tractability has 
seriously harmed the quality of public policy debate on the issue.   
 
The essential problem that we would like to highlight is the use of VFI as though it were merely 
an accounting principle lacking conceptual underpinnings.    
II. The Problem of VFI-VFG Synonymy 
 
A common characteristic of multi-level fiscal systems is that the central government has access 
to more revenues as compared to the subnational governments (SNGs), while the SNGs are 
assigned more expenditure responsibilities as compared to the central government.  We describe 
this state with the term, vertical fiscal asymmetry (VFA).  
 
This state has been described in mainstream literature as VFI. Boadway and Flatters (1982, p. 2) 
and Boadway and Hobson (1993, p. 28) used the term ‘vertical fiscal gap’ to indicate this very 
phenomenon (of VFA).  Ahmad and Craig (1997) provided statistics and measures of the ‘fiscal 
gap’. These authors, however, did not explicitly state the reason for preferring the term ‘fiscal 
gap’ over ‘fiscal imbalance’. Thus, not surprisingly, the two terms came to be used 
interchangeably (e.g., Bird 2003), which we call the problem of VFI-VFG synonymy. This 
however, is more than a semantic problem; at stake are substantial fiscal issues, which have 
serious policy implications.   
 
We argue that the problem lies in a general lack of awareness that VFI and VFG are not only 
different terms used to describe the same phenomenon (VFA) but are also different conceptual 
perspectives on VFA (Table 4). These perspectives differ in terms of the solutions that they 
prescribe for VFA. When expenditure responsibilities are taken as a given, VFAs can be 
addressed either through a reallocation of revenue powers (excluding borrowing powers) or a 
system of intergovernmental transfers (excluding loans). It is seldom made explicit that the term 
‘gap’ was chosen over ‘imbalance’ to emphasise the primacy of the latter over the former. This 
terminology implies that VFA is not an ‘imbalance’ to be ‘restored’ through reassignments, but a 
‘gap’ to be ‘filled’ with intergovernmental transfers. 
 
The use of the term VFG, in this case, rests on the assumption that transfers are useful in their 
own right because they reflect “federal spending priorities” (Boadway 2005, p. 72). “The 
counterpart to the VFG is a system of transfers from the federal government to the provinces, 
which itself serves a useful purpose” (Boadway 2005, p. 53). In fact, the originators of the term 
‘fiscal gap’ (Boadway and Flatters 1982, p. 6) clearly stated that from an economic perspective 
the ideal form of government –that is, the one that is most conducive to efficiency and equity—is 
the single-tier system of government. In their view, in a multi-tier system, a ‘fiscal gap’ is 
desired to enable the central government “to replicate the efficiency and equity outcomes of a 
unitary state, through the application of intergovernmental transfers” (p.6).  Thus, transfers, in 
this view, are determined not by the asymmetry between revenue and expenditure, but by the 
federal government’s need to achieve a second-best unitary outcome in a decentralized setting 
(see Boadway and Tremblay 2006).  
 
The term VFG is used, in this perspective, to avoid using the word imbalance; in other words, 
VFA should not be called VFI because it is a desirable state of affairs (e.g., Breton 1998, pp. 
197-98; Winer and Maslove 1996, p. 52). It should instead be called VFG, which implies that 
there is not an imbalance to be resolved with reassignments, but only a gap to be filled by 
transfers (Boadway 2004a, p. 2; Dahlby 2005, p. 3; Lee 2006, p. 14). In this view, there can be 
“any size of VFG without VFI” (Boadway 2004a, p. 7) because VFI = VFG —Intergovernmental 
transfers. Thus, “the term VFI implies that the gap is not being adequately filled. The existence 
of a VFG need not necessarily mean that there is an imbalance (VFI)” (Boadway 2005, p. 53). 
 
Conventionally, VFA is called VFI. Viewing VFA as VFI supports the proposals that favour 
strengthening SNGs’ tax regimes instead of increasing their financial reliance on 
intergovernmental transfers (see Bird 2000). Subnational revenue autonomy then becomes a 
necessity for restoring balance (King 1984, p. 137). The unequivocal policy prescription states, 
“Local units should tax and spend independently” (Brennan and Buchanan 1980, p. 185).  This 
view regards transfers as an indicator of imbalance and encourages the federal government to 
avoid using them (Smart 2005; Ruggeri et al. 1993).  
 
This perspective contrasts directly with the view that favours transfers because it argues, “VFI 
arises when the gap is filled by using federal transfers from centralized tax revenues” (Singh and 
Plekhanov 2006, p.  429). VFA, which is called VFI in this view, “strains federal-provincial 
relations and undermines the stability of a federation” (Ruggeri et al. 1993, p. 194).  
 
It is clear that VFI and VFG reflect different value judgments on VFA. Nevertheless, these terms 
are often used interchangeably.   
 
 
 
 
 
III. The Problem of Unstated Premises and Assumptions 
 
The existing literature has yet to adequately identify the terms VFI and VFG with the two 
different conceptual perspectives (see Table 4). The essential question at the root of the issue is, 
‘Why should governments decentralize?’ The two perspectives offer two answers: to bring the 
government closer to the people or to split sovereignty between the various levels of 
government.   The answer depends on our beliefs about the extent to which governments act in 
society’s interests, as opposed to their own.  
In the fiscal federalism literature, these contrasting visions of states have produced two theories: 
the theory of public finance and the theory of public choice. James Buchanan, the founder of the 
field of public choice, and Richard Musgrave, the father of modern public finance, elucidated the 
scope of their views during a series of public discussions at the University of Munich in March 
1998 (transcribed in Buchanan and Musgrave 1999). Although Musgrave supported an activist 
view of government, Buchanan’s message was one of combating government intervention in the 
market. Both believe in constitutional rules, but for different roles. For Buchanan, their role is to 
restrain revenue-maximising governments; whereas for Musgrave it is “not only to restrain, but 
to enable” benevolent governments (p. 51). Similarly, both believe in collective action, but 
Musgrave places considerably more relative weight on the 'good' that collective action can do; 
whereas Buchanan places more relative weight on the 'bad' that unconstrained collective action 
might do (p. 108). 
 
From a public finance perspective, decentralization serves to help central governments 
implement redistributive programs that ostensibly seek to maximise social welfare. This 
perspective sees decentralization as a way to enhance the government’s efficiency and 
accountability. From a public choice perspective, decentralization serves to disarm huge central 
governments with monopolistic power to extract rents for themselves. This perspective views 
decentralization as a way of protecting liberty and curbing government’s natural tendency toward 
excess. 
 
When the presumption is that governments act in their constituents’ interests, intergovernmental 
transfers are considered coordinating devices that governments can use to deal with 
decentralization’s failures, such as fiscal externalities and inequities (Boadway and Hobson 1993). 
Governments also can use these transfers to ensure national minimum standards of key public 
services (Boadway 2007). In this perspective, the design of decentralization will exhibit 
characteristics such as intergovernmental cooperation, revenue sharing, and local governmental 
accountability to higher levels of government. This view sees transfers’ adequacy or inadequacy 
as the main issue. This is the VFG perspective.    
 
When the presumption is that government is a self-interested, Leviathan-like entity, 
intergovernmental transfers are considered collusive devices that lead to the public sector’s 
excessive expansion. They create perverse incentives for governments to increase their size 
wastefully (Brennan and Buchanan 1980). In this perspective, the design of decentralization will 
exhibit characteristics such as intergovernmental competition, tax separation (independent 
subnational taxation), and local governmental accountability to local constituents. This viewpoint 
sees subnational ‘own-source’ revenue’s adequacy or inadequacy as the main issue. This is the 
VFI perspective.  
 
These different perspectives lead directly to differences in the instruments policymakers select to 
enact fiscal decentralization. The VFG approach to fiscal adjustment prefers intergovernmental 
transfers (tax sharing and grants), but the VFI approach prefers transferring independent tax-
raising power to SNGs. 
 Essentially, fiscal federalism involves a form of political conflict between the two levels of 
government, which have different interests at stake in the principles of fiscal organisation and the 
design of fiscal federal institutions. Thus, the VFG perspective is more attractive to those who 
favour a national orientation in the organisation of fiscal structures, but the VFI perspective is 
more attractive to the advocates of subnational autonomy. 
 
IV. VFI IN CONVENTIONAL FRAMEWORK: WHAT’S WRONG WITH 
THE OBSERVABLES?  
 
TABLE  4 Vertical Fiscal Asymmetry: Major Approaches 
Views on VFA VFA is VFG VFA is VFI 
In this perspective, revenue-expenditure 
asymmetry (called VFG) emerges from the 
application of the guiding principles of 
Public Economics. VFA (termed VFG) is 
desirable because it reflects federal spending 
priorities (Boadway 2005, p. 53 and p. 72). 
In this perspective, revenue-expenditure 
asymmetry (called VFI) results not from close 
adherence to the dictates of theory, but rather 
from the simple exercise of political power (Bird 
2000, p. 2072). VFA (termed VFI) is seen as 
economically and politically unsustainable (ibid, 
p. 2072).  
Emphasise Desirability of VFA Emphasise Undesirability of VFA 
 
 
 
 
The national government is seen as the only 
government capable of addressing national 
goals of redistribution ( Persson and Tabellini 
1996; Boadway 2005), correcting equity and 
efficiency distortions (Boadway 2004 b), 
insuring regions against shocks (Lockwood 
1999) and facilitating equal treatment in the 
public sector (Boadway 1998).  
The SNGs are seen as the only governments 
efficient at providing services. The higher level 
of government is seen as an intermediary 
between the consumer (taxpayer) and service 
provider (local government). VFA thus 
undermines the autonomy and vitality of 
decentralized decision-making (Oates 1993, p. 
241). It adversely impacts the SNGs’ 
accountability to local residents (Bird 2000, 
2003) and creates fiscal illusion (Rodden and 
Wibbels 2002, p. 520) and common pool 
problems (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 
(1981). It has crowding in effect on (inefficient) 
local spending, known as the flypaper effect 
[Gramlich (1977) and Fisher (1982)].  
Views on Mobility Mobility induces inefficient allocations 
(Wellich 2000). 
Mobility enhances public sector efficiency 
(Tiebout 1956). 
Views on Preferred 
Policy Instrument 
Emphasise utility of federal transfers 
 
 
Emphasise matching of revenue powers with 
expenditure responsibilities 
 
Views on 
Intergovernmental 
Competition 
Tax separation encourages welfare-
deteriorating competition among 
governments to offer less generous levels of 
redistribution (Boadway 2005, p. 64) and to 
use the tax system for ‘beggar thy neighbour’ 
policies (Cai and Treisman 2004).    
Tax separation encourages welfare-enhancing 
competition (Janeba and Schjeldrup 2002) and 
discourages welfare-deteriorating collusions 
(Brennan and Buchanan 1980, p. 183). 
 
The conventional perspective on VFI measures the imbalance between ‘revenue authority’ and 
‘spending responsibilities’ by looking at the data on sub-national governments’ revenues and 
expenditures. Such an analysis, far from being able to prescribe appropriate remedial measures, 
fails even to identify the situation in which fiscal relations are in need of corrective measures. 
Before discussing the reasons for this failure, we will examine how measures of VFI vary within 
the conventional approach. 
IV (a) Multiple Measures of VFI 
The conventional approach to VFI is complicated by multiple and contradictory measures. One 
of the most widely used methods of measuring VFI is to calculate the share of the SNGs’ 
expenditures that are financed from their independent sources of revenue. However, there are 
disagreements within the conventional approach on the scope of variables to be used in this 
formula. For instance, there is widespread disagreement on how to define independent sources of 
revenue.  
 
There are three views regarding independent sources of revenue. One view considers only own-
source revenues as independent sources of revenue. Collins (2002) and Ebel and Yilmaz (2002), 
for instance, measure the VFI ratios (i.e., the ratio of own-source revenues to own-purpose 
expenditures) for each level of government. A variant of this method is to measure the ratio of a 
government’s own-source revenue to its total outlays. This method produces a slightly different 
estimate because the denominator includes transfer payments to other governments and public 
enterprises.  
 
The second view includes shared taxes as an independent source and the third view includes 
unconditional grants in this category. Hunter (1974) proposed three alternative measures of the 
‘coefficient of vertical balance’ that depend on the three different concepts of the independent 
revenue sources of SNGs: own-source revenues only, own-source revenues and shared taxes, and 
own-source revenues, shared taxes, and unconditional grants.  
 
There is also no consensus on how to define ‘own-source tax revenue’. One view is that tax 
revenue can be called own-source only if SNGs have the power to define the tax base and set the 
tax rate. Others argue that tax revenue may be own- source even if the tax base is centrally 
defined and the proceeds are centrally collected; the only condition is that SNGs set the rate and 
collect the revenues.  
 
A third view goes beyond the definition of own-source revenue to analyse whether the revenue is 
narrow-based or broad-based. In this view, subnational revenues must come from broad-based 
taxes for VFI to be qualitatively reduced. The problem of VFI is not resolved if SNGs increase 
their revenues by utilizing narrow and inefficient tax bases (e.g., taxes on financial and capital 
transactions, immovable property, and the use of goods and services). A qualitative reduction in 
VFI can only occur when SNGs have access to broad-based taxes (e.g. personal income taxes, 
general taxes on goods and services, and pay-roll taxes) (see Grewal 1995).   
 
Another widely used indicator of transfer dependence and, hence, VFI (measured either as 
transfers SNGs’ revenues or as transfers SNGs’ expenditures) is the share of transfers in 
subnational finances. In this method, increased transfers imply increased VFI (see Rodden and 
Wibbels 2002, p. 505; McLean 2004, p. 26). However, in this measure, in addition to the 
problem of qualitative aspect of SNGs’ own-source revenues and expenditures, disagreements on 
qualitative aspect of transfers (conditional or unconditional) also emerge. Some have argued that 
researchers must isolate the influence of unconditional transfers to produce a qualitative analysis 
of VFI (e.g., Nice 1987; Ahmad 1997) because unconditional transfers have less impact on fiscal 
imbalance.  
 
In contrast, Hunter (1977) clearly equated transfers, whether conditional or unconditional, with 
vertical imbalance. Transfers, in his view, are an indicator of VFI because they are determined 
by the federal government and are outside subnational control. In Hunter’s view, a lack of 
subnational control over revenue sources is synonymous with VFI.   
 
IV (b) Inadequacy of the Conventional Approach as a Guide for Fiscal 
Policies in the Public Sector  
 
Our presentation of the various measures of VFI demonstrates that the conventional approach is 
often employed without proper attention to detail and context. It tells us nothing about the type 
of fiscal policy a government is pursuing. Furthermore, it does not tell us the extent to which 
revenue powers (i.e., taxes and user charges) should be devolved for accountability and the 
extent to which federal spending powers should be maintained for efficiency and equity. The 
inadequacies of the conventional approach to VFI can be summarised as follows. 
i. Cognitive bias in policy recommendations 
In the most widely used measures of VFI, the very existence of transfers is evidence of VFI. This 
approach creates a bias in policy recommendations because it supports the “public choice” 
perspective, which argues that the lower levels of government are almost always better at 
providing services and that they must raise the revenue to support that spending. This perspective 
echoes K.C. Wheare’s classic statement that “each order of government must have under its 
independent control financial resources sufficient to perform its exclusive function” (Wheare 
1963 [1946], p. 93). However, scholars have rejected Wheare’s argument as anachronistic (e.g., 
Riker 1975, p. 103). Others, at best, have modified his theory by dropping the condition of 
independence and stressing coordination (e.g., Birch 1955, p. 306).  
ii. Conventional estimates of VFI conceal the distortions created by the central 
government’s active role 
 
It is not useful to measure VFI with data on own-source revenues when SNGs do not control the 
base or rate of their own-source taxes and when national regulations determine the scope and 
level of user charges. For instance, in China, Vietnam and Indonesia, the SNGs collect taxes that 
have centrally determined rates and bases. In the Philippines, the SNGs set property tax rates, but 
these rates are limited by a maximum ceiling. Similarly, in China, the SNGs can set the rates for 
urban land use taxes below a certain ceiling (Taliercio 2005, p. 110). Subnational taxing powers 
are also restricted in countries such as Austria, Germany, Mexico and Norway. Likewise, the 
scope and level of user charges in the education sector are often restricted in Italy, Mexico and 
Norway (Joumard and Kongsrud 2003, p. 12).  
 
The data on own-purpose expenditures cannot be used to measure VFI when the central 
government sets the standards for subnational expenditures. For instance, the central government 
closely manages the subnational implementation of various sectoral policies in Germany, 
Norway, Italy and Portugal (Joumard and Kongsrud 2003, p. 25). Similarly, the practice of 
setting regulations for subnational expenditures is prevalent in Denmark, Spain and Mexico. In 
India, the constitution assigns expenditure responsibilities based on theoretical principles; 
however, in practice, the central government exercises substantial control over development 
expenditures through the Planning Commission, an executive body without a constitutional 
status. Discretionary transfers by government ministries further increase the influence of the 
central government.  
 Thus, central government policies can overshadow subnational revenue authority and spending 
responsibilities and blur the distinction between perceived and actual subnational financial 
control.  In such cases, relations are unhealthy to the extent to which SNGs are effectively 
prevented from restoring balance in their finances, whether by raising more own-source revenues 
or by reducing low priority spending.  
iii. Conventional estimates of VFI conceal the distortions created by subnational 
governments’ strategic behaviour  
 
Even if we assume that there is no blurring of roles between the central and subnational 
governments, actual figures will still fail to reflect de jure revenue authority or expenditure 
responsibilities. The power to legislate a tax rate does not imply setting rates at the top of the 
Laffer curve. In fact, incentive problems with some tax bases lead SNGs to behave strategically 
and set the rates that will fall on either side of the Laffer curve.  
 
For instance, an SNG might set tax rates that are inefficiently high (i.e., that fall on the right of 
the Laffer curve) to reduce its revenue-raising capacity and entitle it to more equalisation grants. 
SNGs may also set tax rates too high because of vertical tax competition, a phenomena known as 
vertical fiscal externality (Keen 1998). This happens when SNGs co-occupy tax base and 
perceive that increase in tax rate by either level, will reduce the co-occupied tax base. This 
means part of the cost of rise in subnational tax rate will fall on the federal government. Thus 
SNGs , acting on behalf of their own residents,  fail to take into account the full cost of increase 
in tax rate, to the nation as a whole. Thus, tax rates are set too high (Boadway and Tremblay 
2006). Finally, when taxes imposed by the producing states are borne by residents in the 
consuming states, the former has an incentive to overtax. This is called tax exportation, a 
phenomenon known as direct or negative horizontal fiscal externality (Lockwood 2001). 
On the other hand, SNGs may set tax rates too low because of horizontal tax competition, a 
phenomena known as indirect or positive horizontal fiscal externality. This happens when SNGs 
competing for more capital try to increase their mobile tax bases by setting inefficiently low rates 
(i.e., that fall on the left of the Laffer curve). An SNG may also under-exploit its capacity to raise 
user charges. For instance, the subnational governments in Finland, Korea, Norway and Spain 
have de jure autonomy to set tax bases and rates but rarely use this power (Joumard and 
Kongsrud 2003, p. 12).   
 
Similarly, SNGs are not bound to reflect voter preferences to meet the constitutional obligation 
to provide services. For instance, an SNG might strategically under-provide services (for 
empirical evidence, see Cai and Treisman 2004) or overspend (i.e., soft budget constraint), as 
occurred in Brazil (Montero 2001), Argentina (Gibson and Calvo 2000) and India (Rao and 
Singh 2002). 
iv. Conventional estimates of VFI fail to distinguish between self-inflicted and structural 
imbalances  
 
Another risk of relying on actual data is that this method can produce estimates that “no VFI” 
exists when in fact there is a fundamental structural mismatch between revenue power and 
expenditure responsibility. For example, analysts might find a perfect match if an SNG under-
provides public services. Analysts found this kind of perfect match between local governments’ 
own revenues and local spending in some South African municipalities, but the match was 
achieved at the cost of low levels of services for the local residents (Schroeder and Smoke 2002, 
p. 35). Under the conventional approach to fiscal adjustment, such SNGs are not entitled to 
grants even though they really need them.  
 
Similarly, the conventional method might diagnose VFI when no structural problem exists. For 
instance, mismanagement and waste at the subnational level can cause a low ratio of revenue to 
current expenditure. Likewise, when the federal government practices better fiscal management 
than an SNG, the same ratio results. Subnational governments with a high VFI— in the 
conventional sense of the term— can blame the central government for subnational budget 
deficits or failure to repay subnational debt.  
 
In terms of policy, this approach allows SNGs to demand more tax room or bailouts for fiscal 
mismanagement, poor tax efforts and excess spending. In the Indian fiscal transfer system, for 
instance, the weakest fiscal performers of the SNGs receive bailouts (Rao & Singh 2002). 
Clearly, the figures can be misleading and may not be a useful guide for public policy. 
Therefore, the conventional method for estimating VFI reveals nothing about the type of fiscal 
policy a government is pursuing. 
 
V. VFI IN A DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK: CONTRASTING 
INTERPRETATIONS 
 
Ruggeri and Howard (2001) and Matier et al. (2001) have attempted to refine the conventional 
definition of VFI by focusing on structural rather than actual budget balances, that is, the 
balances inherent in current expenditure and tax policies at each level of government. Ruggeri 
and Howard (2001) go beyond the conventional definition of revenue-expenditure mismatch and 
put it in a dynamic framework by comparing the tendencies towards surpluses or deficits built 
into the existing fiscal structures of different levels of governments. In their words, “Vertical 
fiscal imbalances are the potential result of the dynamics of fiscal structures within a federation. 
They arise when there is a relative mismatch between the revenue growth and spending pressures 
of different orders of government” (Ruggeri and Howard 2001, p. 5). Thus they look at the 
dynamics of fiscal structures, that is, more than the current state of affairs, they are concerned 
with the revenue growth and expenditure growth, and assume that none is static.  
 
In this framework, a fiscal system will be said to be ‘structurally balanced’ if, in the absence of 
debt, growth rates of revenue and expenditure are equal. That is, the built-in growth of spending 
and taxation is maintained at a constant level through time. In the presence of debt and deficit 
financing, a fiscal system will be said to have achieved structural balance when the deficit and 
debt to GDP ratio are maintained at a constant level through time. The focus of their analysis is 
on comparing the structural imbalances of each order of government which result from an 
‘ongoing mismatch’ between the growth rates in revenue and expenditure.  In a parallel study, 
Québec’s Seguin Commission (2002) also linked the imbalance problem to the different 
dynamics of revenues and expenditures at the federal and provincial levels while arguing at the 
same time that imbalance can also be caused by an inappropriate use of federal spending power 
(p. 25).   
 
Matier et al. (2001) also extend the conventional “mismatching” definition of VFI into a 
dynamic framework. In this framework, VFI is said to exist if one level of government has the 
‘fiscal room’ available to reduce taxes or increase program spending -- while the other level of 
government must increase taxes or reduce spending in order to achieve fiscal sustainability. In 
this view, there is no VFI if SNGs have sufficient funds to finance their expenditures in a fiscally 
sustainable manner. Thus, they develop an indicator of VFI that is directly linked with the notion 
of fiscal sustainability. They claim that their framework allows for the direct measurement of the 
degree of VFI and of the adjustment required to eliminate VFI.  
 
These papers from Ruggeri and Howard and from Matier et al. contribute meaningfully to the 
conventional debate. It may however be noted that both measures when applied to the Canadian 
context, yield strikingly opposite results. The former finds a tendency towards increasing VFI in 
Canada while the latter finds no case for VFI in Canada. 
 
Note that there is no conflict between Ruggeri and Howard and Matier et al. regarding the actual 
fiscal position. Both agree that there is a differential between the structural fiscal positions of the 
two levels of government, with the federal government enjoying a larger surplus as compared to 
the provinces and territories combined. The conflict emerges in the interpretation. For Ruggeri 
and Howard, the differential between the structural fiscal positions of the two levels of 
government is an indication of imbalance.  However, for Matier et al., this is not a sign of 
imbalance, because the provinces and territories will have sufficient funds to finance their 
expenditures in a fiscally sustainable manner. Furthermore, Ruggeri and Howard find that the 
fiscal differential between the two levels of government is moving towards more VFI whereas 
Matier et al. find that both levels will continue to meet their projected spending pressures in a 
fiscally sustainable manner.  
 
The conflict with respect to the projected fiscal positions (i.e. the direction in which the said 
differential is moving) is a product of different model specifications and empirical assumptions 
(see Lazar et.al. 2004, pp. 167-71). For instance, in Ruggeri and Howard, the fiscal projections 
(revenue and expenditure growth patterns) are based on population growth. In Matier et al., the 
fiscal projections are based on population growth, as well as population ageing. The addition of 
ageing factor results in a considerably lower projection of the growth rates in the case of 
education spending, which offsets the projected rise in the health spending of the 
provinces/territories. 
 
Secondly, Ruggeri and Howard assume that starting in 2004-05, all federal revenues will be used 
to pay interest on the debt and to finance program spending. This assumption reduces the growth 
of federal transfers. Thus, Ruggeri and Howard assume no growth, freezing the Canada Health 
and Social Transfer (CHST) cash at $21.0 billion base beyond 2005/06 whereas Matier et al. 
assume that CHST cash payments will continue to increase at a constant annual rate of 3.5%.  
 
Thirdly, Ruggeri and Howard assume a higher average annual growth rate of nominal GDP, 
which means that the tax revenues (calculated as tax rate nominal GDP) of the federal 
government will grow faster for those tax sources in which the federal government occupies a 
larger share ( e.g., PIT).  
VI. Rise and Resolution of VFI:   
 
In conventional measures, VFI is simply a measure of the comparative deficits and surpluses of 
the two levels of a government. But, this measure is not substantially related to a rigorous 
definition of VFI, which is intended to represent systemic imbalances or misallocations (i.e. 
inappropriate assignments). A government’s budget deficits or shortfall in surpluses can be 
judged without reference to VFI if there is a desired level of asymmetry and without reference to 
VFG if the transfer system addresses the desired level of asymmetry, which is specific to time, 
country, and context. It may be noted that not all deficits are bad, but deficits on revenues and 
current accounts can be linked to a government’s strategic behaviour, for example, choosing not 
to levy taxes at an ‘average’ rate despite having the authority to do so or indulging in fiscal 
profligacy to fulfill costly election promises. Thus, estimating VFI requires a method not 
dependant on flawed and misleading data. 
 
We argue that VFI rises when allocations deviate from a desirable level of asymmetry. But how 
do we determine the desirable level of VFA? The extent of desirable asymmetry is variable and 
cannot be definitively specified for all countries, or even a particular country at all times. One 
country at different times and different countries at one time have different levels of ‘desirable 
VFA’.  In fact, determining an ‘optimal distribution’ of taxing authority and spending 
responsibility is not a technical exercise because it cannot be based on some fixed universal 
standards of optimality. The notion of ‘optimal’ ― better than any other distribution ― is a 
relative and context-dependent concept; it is determined to a large extent by the nature of federal 
polity and the political consensus on policy goals.  
  
The political consensus takes shape within specific discursive frameworks (Tversky and 
Kahneman’s 1986) that vary from country to county due to distinct historical experiences 
(Schmidt 2006). Furthermore, within a particular country, the consensus on policy goals and, 
hence, on the desired level of asymmetry can change in response to the changing interactions 
between exogenous and endogenous factors and the balance of political forces. For instance, 
Canada (1867) began with federal control of taxation but gradually drifted towards a 
decentralized taxation. On the other hand, Australia (1901) began with concurrent taxation but 
gradually drifted towards a centralized taxation. 
 
However, the concept of optimality implies almost axiomatically that it bars the extremes on 
either side. Figure 1 shows that VFI arises when VFA shifts to either extreme of the spectrum 
(‘A-B’ or ‘D-E’). Both these extreme cases create incentive problems. Some of these problems 
can be mitigated by combining subnational tax autonomy with a well designed transfer system.  
However, as we have already said, determining optimality is a political, rather than technical 
exercise. Yet, it cannot be the product of ad hoc political bargaining either. Thus, the need is to 
put in place collaborative intergovernmental processes and institutions for sustained interactions. 
These can provide formal channels for political negotiations. The continued political interactions 
among political actors at both levels of government can produce desirable outcomes by revealing 
to them their shared long-term interests.  A well-guided rationale can even reveal to more 
affluent SNGs that it is in their long-term interests to make voluntary transfers to their financially 
unstable counterparts. Myers (1990), for instance, demonstrated that such contributions can 
benefit rich SNGs’ economies by discouraging inefficient regional migration.   
 
The range of optimality will lie either within ‘B-C’ or ‘C-D’ depending on the predominant 
nature of federal polity. The most frequent distinction regarding the predominant nature of 
federal polity is between a cooperative and integrated model and competitive and dual or 
separation model (Scharpf 1995; Simeon 1998). In former case, ‘B-C’ is not likely to be 
politically desirable, so ‘C-D’ will represent the range of optimality. In latter case, ‘C-D’ is not 
likely to be politically desirable, so ‘B-C’ will represent the range of optimality (Table 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1:  Optimal Asymmetry: A schematic view 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
TABLE  3  Nature of Federation and the Extent of Desirable Asymmetry  
 
The extent of desirable or optimal asymmetry in a country is determined by the socio-economic 
and political realities of a particular time period. Many factors must be taken into account to 
determine the optimality for a country during that particular period. These factors, detailed 
Nature of VFA (Figure 5) Nature of Federation A-B B-C C-D D-E 
Cooperative and 
integrated model 
 (e.g., Germany, 
Austria) 
n/a 
Misallocation 
(Politically 
undesirable) 
Desirable 
asymmetry 
Misallocation 
(Financial 
Chaos) 
Competitive and dual 
model (e.g., USA, 
Switzerland) 
Misallocation 
(Financial Chaos) 
Desirable 
asymmetry 
Misallocation 
(Politically 
undesirable) 
n/a 
[n/a: not applicable]. 
          
B D 
E 
Incentive  Problems 
 Competitive and 
dual model 
Cooperative and 
integrated model 
 
C 
Complete Tax Decentralization 
 
 
Positive VFI 
(VFA > optimal) 
  Negative VFI 
     (VFA < optimal) 
Moral Hazards Soft Budget Constraints 
Optimal Outcomes  
Complete Tax Centralization 
 
Collaborative 
Intergovernmental 
Processes 
Combine subnational revenue 
control with equalization 
transfers 
A 
below, give a broad sense of the zone (see Figure 2 and Table 5) within which the optimality 
should lie.   
The extent of ‘desirable asymmetry’ at the time a federation is formed depends on the historic 
mode of its formation. When a federation is an aggregation of pre-existing units, a smaller VFA 
may be optimal because the federation’s main goal is to fulfil local aspirations and to ensure the 
SNG’s accountability to local voters. On the other hand, when a federation results from the 
disaggregation of an existing unit, a larger VFA is optimal as the federation’s main goal is to 
motivate the SNGs to design and deliver social programmes based on central preferences. 
 
The extent of ‘desirable asymmetry’ is also determined by the regional disparities that exist 
between the SNGs.  In a federation with large HFIs and a ‘national concern’ for regional 
equality, larger VFA may be optimal. Federations all over the world, with the exception of the 
United States, make transfers to resolve HFIs that vary widely in extent and design.  
 
Within a country, changing economic and political realities determine the optimal levels of 
asymmetry for different periods. The desired level of asymmetry changes with the consensus on 
policy objectives as a result of exogenous shocks− such as a major international crisis (e.g., the 
two World Wars), major changes in taxation practices, or technological advances (e.g., in tax 
enforcement); and endogenous factors − demographic changes, economic disparity, urban 
concentration, or ethnic, religious and cultural diversity.  
 
Certain circumstances may legitimately compel the federal government to increase VFA. In 
Australia and Canada, for example, in the years between World War I and World War II, the 
optimal level of VFA increased due to the increased demand for defence-related goods. The 
governments responded by increasing the level of VFA. In 1942, the Australian Commonwealth 
passed temporary wartime legislation that led to the loss of over 45% of states’ taxation revenues 
(Walsh 1990). Similarly, in Canada, the provinces rented their tax fields to the federal 
government in order to finance the war effort in exchange for annual sums that were fixed for a 
five-year term (Burns 1980). Thus, when more federal spending is required, it becomes desirable 
to increase centralized taxation. Thus, the optimality shifts towards a larger VFA.    
 
The federal government may also be legitimately compelled to reduce VFA in response to a 
sustained decline in the demand for federally provided goods and/or a sustained increase in the 
demand for regionally provided public goods. Following from the example above, in Australia 
and Canada, in the period immediately following World War II, the demand for federally 
provided defence-related goods declined, and the demand for provincial public goods, such as 
social welfare services, rapidly increased (see Hettich and Winer 1986). Thus, as the need for 
federal spending declined and the need for provincial spending increased, it became desirable to 
devolve more tax powers to subnational governments. Thus, the optimality shifted towards a 
smaller VFA.   
 
The Canadian government responded to such a shift by allowing the provinces to progressively 
re-occupy progressively the Personal Income Tax (PIT) field they had leased to Ottawa during 
World War II (see Burns 1980 for a detailed description of these changes). The Australian 
Commonwealth, on the other hand, retained the assignments (McLean 2004, p. 25), and the 
states have been struggling for access to the field of income tax since the 1950s (Grewal 1995). 
Scholars have thus argued that inadequate State tax powers in Australia’s system of 
intergovernmental financial arrangements have resulted in a very high vertical fiscal imbalance 
(Grewal 1995; Warren 2006).  
   
From above it is clear that VFI is a result of a sustained shift in the factors that determine the 
desired level of federal or provincial spending and the desired level of revenue collection by each 
level of government. In fact, the dynamic nature of optimality always precludes the definitive 
absence of VFI. The governments must adjust their fiscal structure—along the centralization-
decentralization continuum during transition periods (e.g., when a country is moving from one 
political balance to another).  
 
A country will remain in a state of VFI as long as the government does not adequately adjust the 
fiscal structure to cope with such changes. The actual adjustments, however, will be determined 
by the politics of the period and various endogenous factors. In fact, endogenous factors explain 
the different post-1945 taxing approaches of Canada and Australia. In Canada, the deciding 
factors were: ethnic disparities, the degree of population dispersal, and regional variations 
(Winer and Maslov 1996). Quebec’s actions further prompted the reinstatement of provincial 
income tax sharing rights in 1957 (James 1997). In contrast, very small differences in per capita 
income between the states (Mathews 1980) and the fact that political decisions, even in Senate,  
are dependent on governing party, not state (Uhr 1989), were the important factors in Australia. 
Thus, the internal differences in ‘governmental traditions’ (Wanna and Weller 2003) between the 
two countries created different types of political equilibrium on the continuum between 
centralization and decentralization.  
 
According to the political equilibrium approach, the level of state taxation in any particular 
country is simply determined by the political ‘equilibrium’ of that country (Diaz-Cayeros 2006). 
The problem with this approach is that it tends to justify any existing level of federal transfers or 
subnational taxation, even if they are a product of factors, such as the relative strength of the 
federal government vis-à-vis SNGs, the relative bargaining power of wealthier SNGs compared 
to poor SNGs, and the secession threats by SNGs that aspire to sovereignty. Such equilibrium, 
based on pure political bargaining, can distort the welfare enhancing and efficiency rationale of a 
fiscal federal structure.  
 
Furthermore, the power politics and the logic of political behaviour in a federation can preclude 
the rationalisation of the fiscal structure and can cause the allocations to lean excessively to 
either side of the continuum. For example, in Russia, the government typically grants preferential 
fiscal agreements to the regions with the most serious separatist claims (Treisman 1999). In fact, 
weakening of the central government can potentially trigger the demand for more revenue 
authority to SNGs. This happened in Indonesia after the historic fall of the Soeharto Regime 
(1966–1998) in May 1998 and in Russia after ‘August 1998 meltdown’ (economic paralysis and 
consequent devaluation of the Rouble on 17th August 1998).  This kind of decentralization is 
unlikely to promote a governance agenda based on transparency and accountability as is largely 
assumed in the neo-institutionalist perspective (see Hadiz 2004 for a critique of neo-
institutionalist perspective). Hadiz (2004) draws on Indonesian experience to illustrate the way in 
which decentralization processes and institutions can be hijacked by a wide range of interests.  
 
An important question to be addressed here is how to ascertain that a VFI exists, that is, the 
allocations in a particular country deviate from the desired level? One view is that a fiscal 
imbalance exists if the observed combination of non-federal and federal goods diverges from the 
combination that would result if the expenditure and taxing decisions of all jurisdictions were 
subject to national vote. Voting can be based on the majority rule (Hartle 1971, p. 103) or on the 
unanimity rule (Hettich and Winer 1986, p. 749-50).  
 
Hettich and Winer advocated the unanimity rule because it prevents special interest groups from 
influencing fiscal outcomes. However, since unanimous voting is not a realistic possibility, the 
authors recommended a requirement to make decisions by pluralities larger than 50%. Lazar et 
al. (2004) and Dahlby (2005) argue that VFI exists when a particular level of government 
complains about insufficient funding and/or tax room and a wide majority of the public supports 
its cause. Though a public opinion poll is a significant factor, yet it is not sufficient because 
political leaders can always manipulate the voters by appealing to their desire for short-term 
gains, even at the cost of long-term gains. 
 
The quantification of optimal asymmetry, relative to which a state of VFI can be defined, will 
require feedback on several variables including the expenditure requirements and expected 
revenues of the federal government as well as the SNGs, and the extent to which transfers are 
required to achieve equalisation and national objectives. This feedback can be obtained from 
election results, public opinion polls, and political debates. This is further supplemented by a 
constant flow of information, provided by the financial markets, on the relative prices of federal 
and provincial goods in a particular period (Hettich and Winer 1986). This information is an 
important indicator of the spending needs of the two levels of government.  
 
The task of gathering such feedback and information can be entrusted to an independent agency. 
Countries like Australia, India, and South Africa have such independent agencies to work out the 
distribution of resources between the various levels of government. However, risk-averse 
political officials can always avoid difficult decisions by taking the agency’s recommendations 
as optional propositions. 
 
Clearly, the problem of determining optimality and resolving VFI is a political one. To be 
consistent with a political economy approach, the solution must be based on incentives and self-
interest. This leads us to the next level dilemma—the dilemma of finding political economy 
solutions to the optimal distribution of taxing and spending authority. An optimal distribution is 
easier said than done. There can be different perspectives on the issue based on values, party 
politics, regional politics, and views on the nature of the federation and the economic role of 
government (i.e., the side one takes in intergovernmental disagreements on vertical fiscal 
relations). This dilemma does pose certain problems yet it should not be projected as a 
reasonable ground for inaction pending further study.  More case studies are necessary to clarify 
the precise mechanisms that can make institutions of shared decision-making and collaboration 
self-enforcing and, thus, politically effective. 
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